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Abstract—Recent studies have revealed that neural network
based policies can be easily fooled by adversarial examples.
However, while most prior works analyze the effects of perturbing
every pixel of every frame assuming white-box policy access, in
this paper we take a more restrictive view towards adversary
generation - with the goal of unveiling the limits of a model’s
vulnerability. In particular, we explore minimalistic attacks by
defining three key settings: (1) black-box policy access: where the
attacker only has access to the input (state) and output (action
probability) of an RL policy; (2) fractional-state adversary: where
only several pixels are perturbed, with the extreme case being
a single-pixel adversary; and (3) tactically-chanced attack: where
only significant frames are tactically chosen to be attacked. We
formulate the adversarial attack by accommodating the three
key settings, and explore their potency on six Atari games by
examining four fully trained state-of-the-art policies. In Breakout,
for example, we surprisingly find that: (i) all policies showcase
significant performance degradation by merely modifying 0.01%
of the input state, and (ii) the policy trained by DQN is totally
deceived by perturbation to only 1% frames.
Index Terms—Reinforcement Learning, Adversarial Attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning [1] has been widely regarded as a promising
technique in reinforcement learning (RL), where the goal
of an RL agent is to maximize its expected accumulated
reward by interacting with a given environment. Although
deep neural network (DNN) policies have achieved super
human performance on various challenging tasks (e.g., video
games, robotics and classical control [2]), recent studies have
shown that these policies are easily deceived under adversarial
attacks [3]–[5]. These works are however found to make some
common assumptions, viz., (1) white-box policy access: where
the adversarial examples are analytically computed by back-
propagating through known neural network weights, (2) full-
state adversary: where the adversary changes almost all pixels
in the state, and (3) fully-chanced attack: where the attacker
strikes the policy at every frame.
Given that most prior works analyze the effects of perturb-
ing every pixel of every frame assuming white-box policy
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Fig. 1: The single pixel attack on Atari Breakout.
access, we propose to take a more restricted view towards
adversary generation - with the goal of exploring the limits
of a DNN model’s vulnerability in RL. In this paper, we thus
focus on minimalistic attacks by only considering adversarial
examples that perturb limited number of pixels in selected
frames, and under the restricted black-box policy access. In
other words, we intend to unveil how little it really takes
to successfully fool state-of-the-art RL policies. Our study is
based on three restrictive settings, namely, black-box policy
access, fractional-state adversary, and tactically-chanced at-
tack. These concepts are detailed next.
Black-box Policy Access (BPA). Most previous studies focus
on a white-box setting [5], that allows full access to a policy
network for back-propagation. However, most systems do not
release their internal configurations (i.e., network structure and
weights), only allowing the model to be queried; this makes
the white-box assumption too optimistic from an attacker’s
perspective [6]. In contrast, we use a BPA setting, where the
attacker only has access to the input and output of a policy.
Fractional-State Adversary (FSA). In the FSA setting, the
adversary only perturbs a small fraction of the input state. This,
in the extreme situation, corresponds to the single-pixel attack
shown in Fig. 1, where perturbing a single pixel of the input
state is found to change the action prescription from ‘RIGHT’
to ‘LEFT’. In contrast, most previous efforts [5] are mainly
based on a full-state adversary (i.e., the number of modified
pixels is fairly large, usually spanning the entire frame).
Tactically-Chanced Attack (TCA). In previously studied RL
adversarial attacks [3], [7], [8], the adversary strikes the policy
on every frame of an episode; this is a setting termed as
the fully-chanced attack. Contrarily, we investigate a relatively
restrictive case where the attacker only strikes at a few selected
frames - a setting we term as tactically-chanced attack, where
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a minimal number of frames is explored to strategically
deceive the policy network.
The proposed restrictive settings are deemed to be signifi-
cant for safety-critical RL applications, such as in the medical
treatment of sepsis patients in intensive care units [9], [10]
and treatment strategies for HIV [11]. In such domains, there
may exist a temporal gap between the acquisition of the input
and the action execution; thereby, providing a time window
in which a tactical attack could take place. In the future, as
we move towards integrating end-to-end vision-based systems
for healthcare, the sensitivity of prescribed medical actions
(such as drug prescription or other medical interventions)
to perturbations in medical images poses a severe threat to
the utility of RL in such domains. Moreover, the restrictive
nature of the attacks makes them practically imperceptible,
greatly reducing the chance of identifying and rectifying them.
With this in mind, the present paper explores the vulnerability
of deep RL models to restrictive adversarial attacks, with
particular emphasis on image-based tasks (i.e., Atari games).
The major challenges, therefore, lie in how to delicately
accommodate the three restricted settings for adversarial at-
tacks in DRL. To this end, we design a mathematical program
with a novel objective function to generate the FSA under the
black-box setting, and propose an entropy-based uncertainty
measurement to achieve the TCA. Note that, the optimization
variables are defined as the discrete 2-D coordinate location(s)
and perturbation value(s) of the selectively attacked pixel(s),
and the designed mathematical program guarantees a success-
ful deception of the policy as long as a positive objective value
can be found. The optimization procedure, for a given input
frame, is then carried out by a simple genetic algorithm (GA)
[12], [13]. In this regard, the Shannon entropy of the action
distribution is specified as the attack uncertainty, whereby only
a few salient frames are tactically attacked. We demonstrate the
sufficiency of the three restrictive settings on four pre-trained
state-of-the-art deep RL policies on six Atari games.
To sum up, the contributions of this paper are listed as:
• We unveil how little it takes to deceive an RL policy by
considering three restrictive settings, namely, black-box
policy access, fractional-state adversary, and tactically-
chanced attack;
• We formulate the RL adversarial attack as a black-
box optimization problem comprising a novel objective
function and discrete FSA optimization variables. We also
propose a Shannon entropy-based uncertainty measure-
ment to sparingly select the most vulnerable frames to
be attacked;
• We explore the three restrictive settings on the policies
trained by four state-of-the-art RL algorithms (i.e., DQN
[1], PPO [14], A2C [15], ACKTR [16]) on six represen-
tative Atari games (i.e., Pong, Breakout, SpaceInvaders,
Seaquest, Qbert, BeamRider);
• Surprisingly, we find that on Breakout: (i) with only a
single pixel (≈ 0.01% of the state) attacked, the trained
policies are completely deceived; and (ii) by merely
attacking around 1% frames, the policy trained by DQN
is totally fooled.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we provide an overview of related works in RL
adversarial attacks, highlighting the novelty of our paper.
Section III presents preliminaries on reinforcement learning
and adversarial attack. In section IV, we describe our proposed
optimization problem formulation and the associated proce-
dure to generate adversarial attacks for deep RL policies. This
is followed by Section V, where we report the numerical results
to prove the effectiveness of our attacks. Finally, Section VI
concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Since Szegedy et al. [17], a number of adversarial attack
methods have been investigated to fool deep neural networks
(DNNs). Most existing approaches generate adversarial exam-
ples through pursuing human invisible perturbation on images
[18]–[20], with the goal of deceiving trained classifiers. In
other words, they mainly focus on the adversarial attacks for
supervised learning tasks. Adversarial attacks in RL have been
relatively less explored to date.
In RL, Huang et al. [3] was the first to demonstrate that
neural network policies are vulnerable to adversarial attack
by adding small modifications to the input state of Atari
games. A full-state adversary (i.e. adversarial examples that
change almost every pixel in the input state) has previously
been generated by a white-box policy access based approach
[21], where the adversarial examples are computed via back-
propagation. Lin et al. [4] proposed the strategically-timed
attack and the so-called enchanting attack, but the adversary
generation is still based on a white-box policy access as-
sumption and full-state perturbation. Besides, Kos et al. [22]
compared the influence of full-state perturbations with random
noise, and utilized the value function to guide the adversary
injection.
In summary, existing works are largely based on white-
box policy access, together with assumptions of a full-state
adversary and fully-chanced attack. There is little research
studying the potency of input perturbations that may be far less
extensive. Therefore, our goal in this paper is to investigate an
extremely restricted view towards the vulnerability of deep RL
models, viz., based on black-box policy access, fractional-state
adversary, and tactically-chanced attack. It is contended that
studying such restrictive scenarios might give new insights on
the geometrical characteristics and overall behavior of deep
neural networks in high dimensional spaces [23].
III. PRELIMINARIES
This section first provides the background of RL and several
representative approaches to learn RL policies. It then illus-
trates the basic concepts and definition of adversarial attack.
A. Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning (RL) [24]–[33] can be formulated
as a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [34], where the agent
interacts with the environment based on the reward and state
transition. This decision making process is shown in Fig.
2, where st and rt are the state and reward received from
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Fig. 2: Markov Decision Process in Reinforcement Learning:
according to the state st, the agent selects an action at, and
then receives the reward rt+1 from the environment.
environment at step t, and at is the action selected by the
agent. Based on at, the agent interacts with the environment,
transitioning to state st+1 and receiving a new reward rt+1.
This procedure continues until the end of the MDP.
The aim of RL [35] is to find an optimal policy pi(θ∗) that
maximizes the expected reward:
θ∗ = max
θ
E[
∑T
t=0
γtr(t)|piθ], (1)
where θ represents the training parameters (e.g., the weights
of a neural network);
∑T
t=0 γ
tr(t)|piθ is the episode rollout;
and γ ∈ (0, 1) denotes the discount factor that balances the
long- and short-term rewards.
To find out the optimal policy parameters θ∗, many different
RL algorithms have been proposed. We select several represen-
tative ones for demonstration, including DQN [1], PPO [14],
A2C [15], ACKTR [16].
• Deep Q-Networks (DQN) [1]: Instead of predicting
the probability of each action, DQN computes the Q
value for each available action. Such Q value Q∗(s, a)
represents the expected accumulative discounted reward
that is approximated from the current frame. Based on
such approximation, DQN is trained via minimizing the
temporal difference loss (i.e., squared Bellman error). In
this paper, the corresponding policy for DQN is achieved
by selecting the action with maximum Q value. Besides,
to keep DQN-trained policy consistent with other three
algorithms, a soft-max layer is added at the end of DQN.
• Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) [14]: PPO is an
off-policy method using policy gradient, and it strikes
a balance among ease of implementation, sample com-
plexity, and ease of tuning. PPO is proposed based
on trust region policy optimization (TRPO) that solves
a constrained optimization problem so as to alleviate
performance instability. However, PPO handles this issue
in a different manner as compared to TRPO: it involves
a penalty term that indicates the KullbackLeibler diver-
gence between the old policy action prediction and the
new one. This operation computes an update at each
step, minimizing the cost function while restricting the
updating step to be relatively small.
• Advantage Actor-Critic (A2C) [36]: A2C is an actor-
critic method that learns both a policy and a state value
function (i.e., also called critic). In A2C, the advantage
A represents the extra reward will get if the action at is
taken, which is formulated by A = Q(st, at) − V (st),
where Q(st, at) is the state-action value and V (st) is the
state value. Such design is to reduce variance of the policy
gradient and increase stability by involving a baseline
term V (st) in A for the gradient estimation.
• Actor Critic using Kronecker-Factored Trust Region
(ACKTR) [16]: ACKTR is an extension of the natural
policy gradient, which optimizes both the actor and
the critic using Kronecker-factored approximate curva-
ture (K-FAC) with trust region. ACKTR is the first
scalable trust region natural gradient method for actor-
critic methods. The investigation on ACKTR suggests
that Kronecker-factored natural gradient approximations
in RL is a promising framework.
Although remarkable performance has been achieved by
these algorithms on many challenging tasks (e.g., video games
[1] and board games [37], [38]), recent studies have revealed
that the policies trained by these algorithms are easily fooled
by adversarial perturbations [3]–[5], as introduced next.
B. Adversarial Attack
Recent studies find that deep learning is vulnerable against
well-designed input perturbation (i.e., adversary) [6]. These
adversaries can easily fool even seemingly high performing
deep learning models with human imperceptible perturbations.
Such vulnerabilities of deep learning models have been well
studied in supervised learning, and also to some extent in RL
[3], [4], [20].
In RL, the aim of an adversarial attack is to find the
optimal adversary δt that minimizes the accumulated reward.
Let T represent the length of an episode, and r(pi, st) indicate
a function that returns the reward given the state st and
DNN based policy pi. Accordingly, the general formulation
of adversarial attack in RL can be formulated as:
min
δt
∑T
t=1
r(pi, st + δt) : ∀t ‖δt‖ 6 L (2)
where the adversary generated at time-step t is represented
by δt, and its norm (i.e., ‖δt‖) is bounded by L. The basic
assumption of Eq. (2) is that the misguided action selection of
policy pi will result in a reward degradation. In other words, an
action prediction apt obtained from the perturbed state st + δt
may differ from the originally unperturbed action aot , thus
threatening the reward value r(·). This corresponds to the
definition of untargeted attacks, which is stated as aot 6= apt .
To solve the optimization problem formulated in Eq. (2),
many white-box based approaches (e.g., FSGM [18]) have
been applied in previous efforts [3], [4]. These white-box
methods are essentially gradient-based methods, as they gen-
erate adversarial examples by back-propagating through the
policy network to calculate the gradient of a cost function
with respect to the input state, i.e., ∇stJ(pi, θ,∆at, st). Here,
θ represents the weights of the neural network; ∆at is the
change in action space; J indicates the loss function (e.g.,
cross-entropy loss).
However, an essential precondition of white-box based
approaches is the complete knowledge of the policy, including
the structure and the model parameters θ. Contrarily, a more
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restrictive setting is black-box policy access [6], that only
allows an attacker to present the input state to the policy and
observe the output. This serves as an oracle that only returns
the output action prediction.
In addition to the above, most prior studies on attacking
RL policies only analyze the effects of perturbing every pixel
of every frame, which is deemed too intensive to be of much
practical relevance. Therefore, this paper aims to provide a far
more restricted view towards the impact of adversarial attacks,
with the goal of unveiling the limits of a models vulnerability.
IV. THE PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
This section provides details of the three key ingredients of
the proposed restrictive attack setting, namely black-box policy
access (BPA), fractional-state adversary (FSA), and tactically-
chanced attack (TCA).
A. Black-box Policy Access
We adopt the commonly used black-box definition [6], [40]
from supervised learning, where the attacker can only query
the policy. In other words, the attacker is unable to analytically
compute the gradient ∇stpi(·|st, δt), but only has the privilege
to query a targeted policy so as to obtain useful information
for crafting adversarial examples. However, such a setting has
been rarely investigated in RL adversarial attacks.
We realize such a BPA setting by formulating the adver-
sarial attack as a black-box optimization problem. To this
end, we propose and utilize a measure D(·) to quantify the
discrepancy between the original action distribution pi(·|st)
(produced by an RL policy without input perturbation) and the
corresponding perturbed distribution pi(·|st + δt). Assuming
a finite set of m available actions a1t , a
2
t , · · · amt , the prob-
ability distribution over actions is represented as pi(·|st) =
[p(a1t ), p(a
2
t ), · · · , p(amt )], where
∑m
j=1 p(a
j
t ) = 1. Typically,
a deterministic policy selects the action o = arg maxj p(a
j
t ).
With this, the black-box attack considers the discrepancy
measure as the optimization objective function, where the state
st is perturbed by adversary δt such that the measure D(·) is
maximized.
The overall problem formulation can thus be stated as:
max
δt
D(pi(·|st), pi(·|st + δt)) : ∀t ‖δt‖ 6 L. (3)
The above mathematical program changes the action dis-
tribution to pi(·|st + δt), from the original (optimal) action
distribution pi(·|st). If the change in action distribution leads
to a change in action selection, then, based on Bellman’s
principle of optimality [36], it can then be concluded that
the perturbed action will lead to a sub-optimal reward as a
consequence of the attack. Under this hypothesis, we propose
to replace the reward minimization problem of Eq. (2) with a
discrepancy maximization formulation proposed in Eq. (3).
The exact choice of discrepancy measure D(·) is expected
to have a significant impact on the attack performance, as
different measures shall capture different patterns of similar-
ities. Previous works [3], [4], [20] apply the Euclidean norm
(e.g., L1, L2, L∞) between pi(·|st+δt) and pi(·|st). However,
such Lp norm cannot guarantee a successful untargeted attack,
since maximizing the Lp norm does not ensure that the action
selection for the perturbed state has been altered. Thus, a suc-
cessful untargeted attack under deterministic action selection
must ensure that arg maxj pi(·|st + δt)j 6= arg maxj pi(·|st)j ,
where pi(·|st)j = p(ajt ).
To enable a more consistent discrepancy measure for untar-
geted attack, we design the following function D˜ based on the
query feedback of the policy:
D˜ = max
j 6=0
pi(·|st + δt)j − pi(·|st + δt)o
where: o = arg max
j
pi(·|st).
(4)
This formulation is different from the Euclidean norm, guar-
anteeing a successful untargeted attack if D˜ is positive. To
support this claim, we refer to the theorem and proof below:
Theorem 1. Suppose discrepancy measure D˜ in Eq. (4) is
positive; policy pi is a deterministic, i.e., choosing action aot
is chosen such that o = arg maxj pi(·|st). Then the adversarial
example δt for policy pi at state st, is guaranteed to make a
successful untargeted attack, i.e.,
arg max
j
[pi(st + δt)]j 6= arg max
j
[pi(st)]j .
Proof. We use the symbol o and p to represent the action index
from state st and perturbed state st + δt respectively. As the
policy pi is deterministic, o and p are computed by:
o = arg max
j
[pi(·|st)]j ,
p = arg max
j
[pi(·|st + δt)]j .
The discrepancy measure D˜ is positive, then we have
D˜ > 0⇒max
j 6=o
pi(·|st + δt)j − pi(·|st + δt)o > 0
⇒max
j 6=o
pi(·|st + δt)j > pi(·|st + δt)o
⇒max
j
pi(·|st + δt)j = max
j 6=o
pi(·|st + δt)j .
Therefore, the perturbed action index p is given by:
p = arg max
j
pi(·|st + δt)j = arg max
j 6=o
pi(·|st + δt)j 6= o
⇒ arg max
j
[pi(·|st + δt)]j 6= arg max
j
[pi(·|st)]j . 
With the discrepancy measure D˜, the mathematical program
for generating adversarial attacks is given by,
max
δt
max
j 6=o
pi(·|st + δt)j − pi(·|st + δt)o
where: ∀t ‖δt‖ 6 L, o = arg max
j
pi(·|st)j (5)
When resolving the optimization problem in Eq. (5), δt has
to be determined by its parameterisation. In this paper, δt is
limited to perturbing only a small fraction of the input state
(i.e., fractional-state adversary), as described next.
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(a) Full-state adversary [18] (b) Fractional-state adversary [39]
Fig. 3: Full-state adversary versus the FSA
B. Fractional-State Adversary
To explore adversarial attacks limited to a few pixels in RL,
we investigate the fractional-state adversary (FSA) setting. In
comparison with the full-state adversary depicted in Fig. 3(a),
FSA only perturbs a fraction of the state; shown in Fig. 3(b).
The extreme scenario for FSA is merely a single-pixel attack,
which is deemed to be more physically realizable for the
attacker than a full-state one. For instance, pasting a sticker
or a simple fading of color in the “STOP” sign could easily
lead to a FSA in Fig. 3(b).
To achieve the FSA setting, we propose a different parame-
terization for the adversary δt with the discrete representations
of perturbed pixels. In doing so, we parameterize the adversary
δt by its corresponding pixel coordinates (i.e., xt, yt) and
perturbation value pt:
δt = P(xt, yt,pt)
= P(x1t , y1t , p1t , · · · , xnt , ynt , pnt )
(6)
where n is the number of pixels that are attacked, xit, y
i
t
are coordinate values of the perturbed pixel, and pit is the
adversarial perturbation value of the ith pixel. With Eq. (6),
the final black-box optimization problem is reformulated as:
max
xt,yt,pt
max
j 6=o
[pi(·|st + P(xt, yt, pt))]j − [pi(·|st + P(xt, yt, pt))]o
where: ∀t o = argmax
j
[pi(·|st)]j ;
∀t 0 6 xit 6 Ix, xit ∈ N, i = [1, 2, · · · , n];
∀t 0 6 yit 6 Iy, yit ∈ N, i = [1, 2, · · · , n];
∀t 0 6 pit 6 Ip, pit ∈ N, i = [1, 2, · · · , n];
(7)
where Ix, Iy are the integral upper bounds of xt and yt
respectively, Ip is the perturbation value bound of pt, and n is
the FSA size that controls the number of pixels to be attacked
given any input state st. The extreme case is n = 1, implying
that there is only one pixel attacked in a frame. To the best of
our knowledge, such one-pixel attack has never been explored
in the existing literature on RL adversarial attacks.
To obtain the optimal xt, yt,pt, we adopt the genetic algo-
rithm (GA) [12], [13], [41] (i.e., an evolutionary computation
[42]–[49] method for black-box optimization). The pseudo
code of GA is illustrated in Algorithm 1 (lines 7-17). A
population containing λ individuals is evolved, where each
individual δit, i ∈ [1, λ] is a particular adversarial example that
is evaluated by the objective function in Eq. (7). The top-λβ
individuals with respect to the objective value, are selected
as elites to survive in the new generation (line 10). Based on
standard crossover (line 12) and mutation (line 13) operations,
another population pop′ is reproduced to replace the old pop.
Algorithm 1: Attack by Genetic Algorithm
Input: st – state at time-step t; n – number of pixels for attack; λ –
population size; β – rate of elitism; γ – rate of mutation; fm
– maximum number of function evaluations; ζ∗ – TCA
boundary value
1 Load the policy pi well-trained by a particular RL algorithm;
2 Obtain the RL input state s in a particular Atari game;
3 Calculate the attack uncertainty ζt by Eq. (8);
4 if ζ > ζ∗ then
// No adversarial attack
5 δt = none;
6 else
// Explore the n pixel attack
7 Initialize the population pop with randomly generating λ
individuals;
8 repeat
9 Evaluate fi, i = 1, · · ·λ using Eq. (7);
10 Save the top-λβ individuals in pop′;
11 for j=1:λ(1−β)
2
do
12 Crossover: generate δjc with one-point crossover [12];
13 Mutation: δjm = δj + γ · j , j ∈ N (0, 1);
14 Append δc and δm to pop′;
15 pop = pop′
16 until the maximum objective evaluations fm reached;
17 Return the optimal FSA δ∗ = [x∗, y∗, p∗];
This process repeats until the maximum objective evaluation
number fm is reached.
C. Tactically-Chanced Attack
To explore the adversarial attacks on a restricted number of
frames, we design the tactically-chanced attack (TCA) where
the attacker strategically strikes only salient frames that are
likely to be most contributing to the accumulated reward.
In contrast, most existing approaches [3] apply adversarial
examples on every frame, which is referred to as fully-chanced
attack. Our proposed TCA is clearly more restrictive, as can
further be highlighted from three different perspectives: (1)
due to the communication budget restriction, the attacker may
not be able to strike the policy in a fully-chanced fashion;
(2) a tactically-chanced attack is less likely to be detected by
the defender; and (3) only striking the salient frames improves
the attack efficiency, as many frames contribute trivially to the
accumulated reward.
To this end, we define the normalized Shannon entropy of
the action distribution pi(·|st) = [p(a1t ), p(a2t ), · · · , p(amt )] as
a measure of the attack uncertainty. Such attack uncertainty
(ζt) of each frame is given by,
ζt = −
∑m
i=0
p(ait) · log p(ait)
logm
(8)
where p(ai) is the probability of action ai; m is the dimension
of the action space. As probability p(ai) ∈ [0, 1], ζt is
constrained in (0, 1]. In such a formulation, the frame with
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Fig. 4: The six representative Atari games [50] (i.e., Pong, Breakout, SpaceInvaders, Seaquest, Qbert, BeamRider) applied in
the experiments
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Fig. 5: The attack uncertainty ζt on Pong.
relatively low ζt indicates that the policy has a high confidence
in its prescribed action. Hence, we assume that attacking such
frames is expected to effectively disrupt the policy.
We demonstrate the attack uncertainty on Pong in Fig.
5; similar trends can be observed on the other games as
well. In the figure, the frames with smaller ζt, marked by
brown rectangles, depict that the ball is close to the paddle.
On the other hand, the blue rectangle marked ones with
larger ζt (around 1) indicate that the ball is distant from the
paddle. Attacking the brown marked frames are intuitively
more efficient to fool the policy, as they are likely to lead
to a more considerable reward loss. In contrast, an attack may
be relatively inconsequential for the blue marked frames. As
the ball is distant from the paddle, attacking such frames will
have little impact on the reward.
Therefore, we formulate the TCA by defining a TCA
threshold (ζ∗) as shown by the red line in Fig. (5); this
controls the proportion of attacked frames, where only those
frames with an uncertainty value below ζ∗ are perturbed. In
the experimental section, we analyze the effect of threshold ζ∗
by varying its values; this also helps us to explore how little
it actually takes to deceive a policy (from the perspective of
the number of frames attacked). The adversary δt under TCA
setting is thus given by:
δt =
{ P(x∗t , y∗t , p∗t ), if ζt < ζ∗t ,
none, if ζt > ζ∗t . (9)
Eq. (9) suggests that if the attack uncertainty (ζt) is smaller
than ζ∗, an adversary shall be generated by solving the
optimization problem in Eq. (7). Otherwise, the attacker will
tactically hide without wasting sources on trivial frames.
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512
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Batch norm
Batch norm
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Fig. 6: The neural network structure for playing Atari games
Summary. By considering the three settings (i.e., BPA, FSA
and TCA), we carry out an exploration of restrictive scenarios
for RL adversarial attacks, only focusing on a minimal number
of pixels and frames under black-box policy access.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
We evaluate the three restrictive settings on six Atari games
in OpenAI Gym [50] with various difficulty levels, including
Pong, Breakout, SpaceInvaders, Seaquest, Qbert, and Beam-
Rider1. These games are shown in Fig. 4. For each game,
the policies are trained by four start-of-the-art RL algorithms,
including DQN [1], PPO2 [14], A2C [15], ACKTR [16]. The
network structure is adopted from [51], and it keeps same for
all the four RL algorithms.
A. Experiment Setup
We utilize the fully-trained policies from the RL baseline
zoo [52]. Each policy follows the same pre-processing steps
and neural network architecture (i.e., shown as Fig.6) in [1].
The input state st of the neural network is the concatenation
of the last four screen images, where each image is resized
to 84× 84. The pixel value of the grey scale image is in the
range of [0, 255] stepped by 1. The output of the policy is a
distribution over candidate actions for PPO2, A2C, ACKTR,
and an estimation of Q values for DQN.
To calculate the attack uncertainty for DQN, the soft-max
operation is applied to normalize the output. Moreover, given
the image size and pixel value, the constraints in Eq. (7) are
set as Ix = 84, Iy = 84, Ip = 255. In the GA, the population
size λ is 10, and the maximum number of objective evaluations
fm is set as 400. However, as our objective function has
a guarantee for successful untargeted adversarial attack, the
optimization process will terminate when a positive function
value is found. To investigate the impacts of FSA size n, we
1Our code is available at https://github.com/RLMA2019/RLMA
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Fig. 7: The results of adversarial attack with different FSA size n (i.e. pixel number), where the line and shaded area illustrate
the mean and standard deviation of 30 independent runs respectively.
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Fig. 8: The results of adversarial attack with different TCA boundary ζ∗, where the line and shaded area illustrate the mean
and standard deviation of 30 independent runs respectively.
apply a grid search in [1, 10] scaled by 1. We also apply a grid
search for tactically-chanced attack (TCA) threshold ζ∗ in the
range of [0, 1]. This corresponds to the different proportion of
attacked frames as depicted by the x-axis in Fig. 8.
B. Results for Fractional-State Adversary
We investigate the effectiveness of the fractional-state ad-
versary (FSA) via varying the value of FSA size n in the
range of [1, 10] scaled by 1, where n = 1 corresponds to
the extreme case that only one pixel is perturbed. For a fair
comparison with respect to different algorithms and games,
we set the TCA threshold ζ∗ as the mean of all frames’ ζ
that are obtained from the unattacked policy testing. Fig. 7
illustrates the performance (i.e. accumulated reward) drop on
the policies trained by the four RL algorithms on the six Atari
games. Several interesting observations can be noted.
(1) Overall, the FSA size n is positively related to the
performance drop. That is to say, the FSA with larger n is able
to deceive the policy more easily. (2) On most of the games,
the policies are almost completely fooled with n ≤ 4. This
indicates a small FSA size is sufficient to achieve a successful
adversarial attack, indicating the efficiency of FSA. (3) There
is a relatively huge performance drop for DQN based policy
in comparison with policies trained by other RL algorithms,
especially on Breakout and Qbert. It suggests that DQN based
policy is more volunerable; whereas, the ACKTR based policy
is more robust under the attack with FSA setting. (4) The
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Fig. 9: The relationship between attacked frames and total frames, where the line and shaded area illustrate the mean and
standard deviation of 30 independent runs respectively.
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Fig. 10: The relationship between attacked frames and total frames, where the line and shaded area illustrate the mean and
standard deviation of 30 independent runs respectively.
results also imply that the high performance of unattacked
policy cannot guarantee a strong robustness to resist attack.
For instance, in SpaceInvaders, the original performance of
A2C is higher than DQN, but the performance of A2C drops
faster than that of DQN as shown in Fig. 7(c). (5) Most
importantly, we surprisingly find that: on Breakout, with single
pixel attacked, the policy trained by all the four RL algorithms
are completely deceived with the accumulated reward close to
0. On Qbert and BeamRider, the policy trained by DQN is also
completely deceived with only a single pixel attacked. Such
single pixel attack corresponds to an approximate perturbation
proportion of 0.01% (i.e., 1/(84× 84)) of the total number of
pixels in a frame.
C. Results for Tactically-Chanced Attack
We study the tactically-chanced attack (TCA) by altering
the TCA threshold ζ∗. Different ζ∗ corresponds to different
proportion of attacked frames. In our exploration, we set the ζ∗
in the range of (0, 1], where ζ∗ = 0 and ζ∗ = 1 correspond to
0% and 100% proportion of attacked frames, respectively. Re-
call that according to the results for FSA size analysis shown
in Fig. 7, most of the policies are sufficiently fooled with no
more than 4 pixels attacked. Hence, for a fair comparison, we
set the FSA size n = 4 in subsequent experiments. The results
are displayed in Fig. 8, where we observe that in general the
performance (i.e., accumulated reward) decreases when higher
proportion of frames are attacked. This demonstrates that the
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Fig. 11: The impact of attacked frames for accumulated reward on Breakout
policies are more easily fooled with more frames attacked. In
addition, we make several other fascinating findings.
(1) In Fig. 8(a) on Pong, only with 10% of frames attacked,
the models trained by DQN and PPO2 are totally fooled
with the accumulated reward around −20. This also suggests
that the model trained by A2C and ACKTR are more robust
than those trained by DQN and PPO2. (2) In Fig. 8(b) on
Breakout, the model trained by DQN is totally deceived by
only perturbing less than 5% of frames on average. (3) In
Fig. 8(f) on Beamrider, even when the proportion of attacked
frames is about 20%, all policies can only obtain a reward with
less than 2000. Especially for the policies trained by DQN and
PPO2, the accumulated reward drops from 14000 to 2000.
We further analyze the exact number of attacked frames
with different TCA threshold values that represent different
proportion of attacked frames. As shown in Fig. 9, the number
of attacked frames increases when the proportion value is
higher, and the exact number of attacked frames is relatively
low considering the number of total frames. In Fig. 9 (b), on
Breakout, when the proportion value is smaller than 20%, less
than 50 frames are attacked. The same finding is also observed
on Beamrider, where less than 100 frames are attacked when
the proportion value is smaller than 20%. On Pong, to achieve
a same reward degradation, the policy trained by A2C requires
more frames attacked than that of the other three RL policies.
For a better demonstration, we also analyze the relation
between attacked frames and total frames in Fig. 10. We find
similar trends on the six games, where the number of total
frames decreases when more frames are attacked. In particular,
such relation is significantly observed on Breakout, where
attacking less than 50 frames considerably reduces the number
of total frames to a small value from 2000. This probably
results from the fact that the attacked frames may cause (i) the
termination of the game, or (ii) a loss of life. Both outcomes
greatly shorten the episode, resulting in a smaller number of
total frames. For instance, if the paddle in Breakout is deceived
to miss the ball, the agent would lose 1/5 life.
To explore a more restrictive setting, we additionally ex-
amine the single-pixel (n = 1) attack on limited frames.
We illustrate the results on Breakout as shown in Fig. 11,
and similar trends can be observed on other games. From
this figure, we surprisingly find that by only attacking on
six frames on average, the policy trained by DQN is totally
fooled with reward decreasing from 224 to 13.7. Here, six
frames correspond to an attack ratio of 6/535 ≈ 1%, where
535 is the averaged number of total frames. Similar surprising
findings are also observed on policies trained by PPO2, A2C
and ACKTR. For instance, the policy trained by PPO2 shows a
significant reward decline with only 27 frames attacked under
the same TCA setting as other policies.
D. Initialization Analysis
The GA population initialization plays an important role
in efficiently generating successful adversarial examples, and
thus highlights the practicality of the approach. To this end, we
study the effects of random initialization versus warm starting
based on prior data. In RL, the simplest form of prior origi-
nates from the correlation between states in a in the Markov
Decision Process (MDP); this also distinguishes RL from
other supervised learning tasks (e.g., classification), where the
predictions on different data points are independent. Thus, with
the existence of correlations between adjacent frames in mind,
we set up different types population initialization in the GA:
(1) GA-RI - random initialization (RI) of pop0; (2) GA-WSI-
warm start initialization (WSI) of pop0 by adopting the optimal
adversarial example x∗p found in the previous attacked frame.
To ensure a fair comparison and for ease of presentation,
we randomly attack four frames for all the six games. On
each attacked frame, the GA optimization is executed 10 times
independently on both types of initialization. The comparison
results are shown in Fig. 12, where the dash line and shaded
area respectively represent the mean and standard deviation
of loss values for the 10 runs. In general, we can clearly
see that GA-WSI significantly speeds up the optimization
convergence while finding the successful adversarial examples
(i.e., corresponding to positive objective function values). In
particular, on many frames (e.g., Pong: ξ1, ξ2, ξ4; Breakout: ξ2;
Space Invaders: ξ3; Qbert: ξ3, ξ4), the GA-RI takes relatively
more time (or is even unable) to obtain a positive objective
value; whereas the GA-WSI achieves it easily.
We interestingly find that, in some cases, GA-WSI provides
a successful adversary without the need of any optimization.
This observation underlines the real possibility of launching
successful adversarial attacks on deep RL policies in real-
time at little/no computational cost, a threat that raises severe
concerns about their deployment especially in safety critical
applications
In summary, our experimental results and examinations
suggest that by moderately setting the FSA size n and TCA
threshold ζ∗, the attacker could successfully disrupt a seem-
ingly high performing policy. Moreover, our investigations
on different initialization manners (i.e., GA-RI and GA-WSI)
indicate that even restrictive black-box settings for adversarial
attack can pose a big challenge to the utility of state-of-the-art
RL methods, thus highlighting the need to focus on robustness
in the future.
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Fig. 12: The comparison between random initialization and case-injected initialization, where the line and shaded area illustrate
the mean and standard deviation of 10 independent runs respectively.
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CONCLUSION
This paper explores the minimalistic scenarios for adversar-
ial attack in deep reinforcement learning (RL), comprising (1)
black-box policy access where the attacker only has access
to the input (state) and output (action probability) of an
RL policy; (2) fractional-state adversary where only a small
number of pixels are perturbed, with the extreme case of one-
pixel attack; and (3) tactically-chanced attack where only some
significant frames are chosen to be attacked. We verify these
settings on policies that are trained by four state-of-the-art
RL policies on six Atari games. We surprisingly find that: (i)
with only a single pixel (≈ 0.01% of the state) attacked, the
trained policies can be completely deceived; and (ii) by merely
attacking around 1% frames, the policy trained by DQN is
totally fooled on certain games.
REFERENCES
[1] V. Mnih, K. Kavukcuoglu, D. Silver, A. Graves, I. Antonoglou, D. Wier-
stra, and M. Riedmiller, “Playing atari with deep reinforcement learn-
ing,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.5602, 2013.
[2] Z. Li, J. Liu, Z. Huang, Y. Peng, H. Pu, and L. Ding, “Adaptive
impedance control of human–robot cooperation using reinforcement
learning,” IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics, vol. 64, no. 10,
pp. 8013–8022, 2017.
[3] S. Huang, N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow, Y. Duan, and P. Abbeel,
“Adversarial attacks on neural network policies,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1702.02284, 2017.
[4] Y.-C. Lin, Z.-W. Hong, Y.-H. Liao, M.-L. Shih, M.-Y. Liu, and M. Sun,
“Tactics of adversarial attack on deep reinforcement learning agents,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.06748, 2017.
[5] X. Yuan, P. He, Q. Zhu, and X. Li, “Adversarial examples: Attacks and
defenses for deep learning,” IEEE transactions on neural networks and
learning systems, 2019.
[6] P.-Y. Chen, H. Zhang, Y. Sharma, J. Yi, and C.-J. Hsieh, “Zoo: Zeroth
order optimization based black-box attacks to deep neural networks
without training substitute models,” in Proceedings of the 10th ACM
Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security. ACM, 2017, pp. 15–
26.
[7] A. Pattanaik, Z. Tang, S. Liu, G. Bommannan, and G. Chowdhary,
“Robust deep reinforcement learning with adversarial attacks,” in Pro-
ceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and MultiAgent Systems. International Foundation for Autonomous
Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2018, pp. 2040–2042.
[8] L. Pinto, J. Davidson, R. Sukthankar, and A. Gupta, “Robust adver-
sarial reinforcement learning,” in Proceedings of the 34th International
Conference on Machine Learning-Volume 70. JMLR. org, 2017, pp.
2817–2826.
[9] A. Raghu, “Reinforcement learning for sepsis treatment: Baselines and
analysis,” Reinforcement Learning for Real Life, 2019.
[10] A. Raghu, M. Komorowski, L. A. Celi, P. Szolovits, and M. Ghassemi,
“Continuous state-space models for optimal sepsis treatment-a deep
reinforcement learning approach,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.08422,
2017.
[11] S. Parbhoo, J. Bogojeska, M. Zazzi, V. Roth, and F. Doshi-Velez,
“Combining kernel and model based learning for hiv therapy selection,”
AMIA Summits on Translational Science Proceedings, vol. 2017, p. 239,
2017.
[12] J. H. Holland, “Genetic algorithms,” Scientific american, vol. 267, no. 1,
pp. 66–73, 1992.
[13] K. Deep, K. P. Singh, M. L. Kansal, and C. Mohan, “A real coded
genetic algorithm for solving integer and mixed integer optimization
problems,” Applied Mathematics and Computation, vol. 212, no. 2, pp.
505–518, 2009.
[14] J. Schulman, F. Wolski, P. Dhariwal, A. Radford, and O. Klimov, “Prox-
imal policy optimization algorithms,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1707.06347,
2017.
[15] V. Mnih, A. P. Badia, M. Mirza, A. Graves, T. Lillicrap, T. Harley,
D. Silver, and K. Kavukcuoglu, “Asynchronous methods for deep rein-
forcement learning,” in International conference on machine learning,
2016, pp. 1928–1937.
[16] Y. Wu, E. Mansimov, R. B. Grosse, S. Liao, and J. Ba, “Scalable trust-
region method for deep reinforcement learning using kronecker-factored
approximation,” in Advances in neural information processing systems,
2017, pp. 5279–5288.
[17] C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna, D. Erhan, I. Goodfellow,
and R. Fergus, “Intriguing properties of neural networks,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1312.6199, 2013.
[18] I. Goodfellow, N. Papernot, S. Huang, Y. Duan, P. Abbeel, and
J. Clark, “Attacking machine learning with adversarial examples,” Ope-
nAI. https://blog. openai. com/adversarial-example-research, 2017.
[19] A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio, “Adversarial machine learning
at scale,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1611.01236, 2016.
[20] C. Xiao, X. Pan, W. He, J. Peng, M. Sun, J. Yi, B. Li, and D. Song,
“Characterizing attacks on deep reinforcement learning,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1907.09470, 2019.
[21] I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy, “Explaining and harnessing
adversarial examples,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572, 2014.
[22] J. Kos and D. Song, “Delving into adversarial attacks on deep policies,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.06452, 2017.
[23] A. Fawzi, S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, and P. Frossard, “The robustness
of deep networks: A geometrical perspective,” IEEE Signal Processing
Magazine, vol. 34, no. 6, pp. 50–62, 2017.
[24] X. Qu, Y.-S. Ong, Y. Hou, and X. Shen, “Memetic evolution strategy
for reinforcement learning,” in 2019 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary
Computation (CEC). IEEE, 2019, pp. 1922–1928.
[25] Z. Xie and Y. Jin, “An extended reinforcement learning framework
to model cognitive development with enactive pattern representation,”
IEEE Transactions on Cognitive and Developmental Systems, vol. 10,
no. 3, pp. 738–750, 2018.
[26] D. Liu, X. Yang, D. Wang, and Q. Wei, “Reinforcement-learning-based
robust controller design for continuous-time uncertain nonlinear systems
subject to input constraints,” IEEE transactions on cybernetics, vol. 45,
no. 7, pp. 1372–1385, 2015.
[27] B. Xu, C. Yang, and Z. Shi, “Reinforcement learning output feedback
nn control using deterministic learning technique,” IEEE Transactions
on Neural Networks and Learning Systems, vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 635–641,
2013.
[28] F. de La Bourdonnaye, C. Teulie`re, J. Triesch, and T. Chateau, “Learning
to touch objects through stage-wise deep reinforcement learning,” in
2018 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and
Systems (IROS). IEEE, 2018, pp. 1–9.
[29] S. Badreddine and M. Spranger, “Injecting prior knowledge for trans-
fer learning into reinforcement learning algorithms using logic tensor
networks,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.06576, 2019.
[30] C. Colas, P.-Y. Oudeyer, O. Sigaud, P. Fournier, and M. Chetouani, “Cu-
rious: Intrinsically motivated modular multi-goal reinforcement learn-
ing,” in International Conference on Machine Learning, 2019, pp. 1331–
1340.
[31] C.-T. Lin and C. G. Lee, “Reinforcement structure/parameter learning for
neural-network-based fuzzy logic control systems,” IEEE Transactions
on Fuzzy Systems, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 46–63, 1994.
[32] Y. Hou, Y.-S. Ong, L. Feng, and J. M. Zurada, “An evolutionary
transfer reinforcement learning framework for multiagent systems,”
IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, vol. 21, no. 4, pp.
601–615, 2017.
[33] Z. Zhang, Y.-S. Ong, D. Wang, and B. Xue, “A collaborative multiagent
reinforcement learning method based on policy gradient potential,” IEEE
transactions on cybernetics, 2019.
[34] C. H. Papadimitriou and J. N. Tsitsiklis, “The complexity of markov
decision processes,” Mathematics of operations research, vol. 12, no. 3,
pp. 441–450, 1987.
[35] J. Schulman, S. Levine, P. Abbeel, M. Jordan, and P. Moritz, “Trust
region policy optimization,” in International Conference on Machine
Learning, 2015, pp. 1889–1897.
[36] R. S. Sutton and A. G. Barto, Reinforcement learning: An introduction.
MIT press, 2018.
[37] D. Silver, A. Huang, C. J. Maddison, A. Guez, L. Sifre, G. Van
Den Driessche, J. Schrittwieser, I. Antonoglou, V. Panneershelvam,
M. Lanctot et al., “Mastering the game of go with deep neural networks
and tree search,” nature, vol. 529, no. 7587, p. 484, 2016.
[38] D. Silver, J. Schrittwieser, K. Simonyan, I. Antonoglou, A. Huang,
A. Guez, T. Hubert, L. Baker, M. Lai, A. Bolton et al., “Mastering
the game of go without human knowledge,” Nature, vol. 550, no. 7676,
p. 354, 2017.
[39] T. B. Brown, D. Mane´, A. Roy, M. Abadi, and J. Gilmer, “Adversarial
patch,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1712.09665, 2017.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM 12
[40] J. Su, D. V. Vargas, and K. Sakurai, “One pixel attack for fooling deep
neural networks,” IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation,
2019.
[41] D. P. Bertsekas, “Nonlinear programming,” Journal of the Operational
Research Society, vol. 48, no. 3, pp. 334–334, 1997.
[42] Y. Jin, J. Branke et al., “Evolutionary optimization in uncertain
environments-a survey,” IEEE Transactions on evolutionary computa-
tion, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 303–317, 2005.
[43] Y. Jin, “A comprehensive survey of fitness approximation in evolutionary
computation,” Soft computing, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 3–12, 2005.
[44] Y. Jin, M. Olhofer, and B. Sendhoff, “A framework for evolutionary
optimization with approximate fitness functions,” IEEE Transactions on
evolutionary computation, vol. 6, no. 5, pp. 481–494, 2002.
[45] Y. Jin, H. Wang, T. Chugh, D. Guo, and K. Miettinen, “Data-driven
evolutionary optimization: an overview and case studies,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Evolutionary Computation, vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 442–458, 2018.
[46] B. Liu, L. Wang, Y.-H. Jin, F. Tang, and D.-X. Huang, “Improved particle
swarm optimization combined with chaos,” Chaos, Solitons & Fractals,
vol. 25, no. 5, pp. 1261–1271, 2005.
[47] B. Liu, L. Wang, and Y.-H. Jin, “An effective pso-based memetic
algorithm for flow shop scheduling,” IEEE Transactions on Systems,
Man, and Cybernetics, Part B (Cybernetics), vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 18–27,
2007.
[48] X. Ma, Q. Zhang, G. Tian, J. Yang, and Z. Zhu, “On tchebycheff
decomposition approaches for multiobjective evolutionary optimization,”
IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation, vol. 22, no. 2, pp.
226–244, 2017.
[49] L. Feng, Y.-S. Ong, S. Jiang, and A. Gupta, “Autoencoding evolutionary
search with learning across heterogeneous problems,” IEEE Transactions
on Evolutionary Computation, vol. 21, no. 5, pp. 760–772, 2017.
[50] G. Brockman, V. Cheung, L. Pettersson, J. Schneider, J. Schul-
man, J. Tang, and W. Zaremba, “Openai gym,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1606.01540, 2016.
[51] V. Mnih, K. Kavukcuoglu, D. Silver, A. A. Rusu, J. Veness, M. G.
Bellemare, A. Graves, M. Riedmiller, A. K. Fidjeland, G. Ostrovski
et al., “Human-level control through deep reinforcement learning,”
Nature, vol. 518, no. 7540, p. 529, 2015.
[52] A. RAFFIN, “Reinforcement learning baseline zoo,” https://https://
github.com/araffin/rl-baselines-zoo, 2018.
Xinghua Qu received the B.S. degree in Aircraft
Design and Engineering from Northwestern Poly-
technic University, China, in 2014, and the M.S.
degree in Aerospace Engineering, School of Astro-
nautics, Beihang University, China, in 2017.
He is currently the Phd student of school of com-
puter science and engineering, Nanyang Technolog-
ical University, Singapore, and his research interests
include reinforcement learning, adversarial machine
learning and evolutionary computation.
Zhu Sun received her Ph.D. degree from School of
Computer Science and Engineering, Nanyang Tech-
nological University (NTU), Singapore, in 2018.
During her Ph.D. study, she focused on designing
efficient recommendation algorithms by considering
side information. Her research has been published
in leading conferences and journals in related do-
mains (e.g., IJCAI, AAAI, CIKM, ACM RecSys and
ACM UMAP,). Currently, she is a research fellow
at School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering,
NTU, Singapore.
Yew-Soon Ong received a PhD degree on Artificial
Intelligence in complex design from the Computa-
tional Engineering and Design Center, University
of Southampton, UK in 2003. He is a Professor
and the Chair of the School of Computer Science
and Engineering, Nanyang Technological University
(NTU), Singapore, where he is also the Director
of the Data Science and Artificial Intelligence Re-
search Center and Principal Investigator of the Data
Analytics and Complex Systems Programme at the
RollsRoyce@NTU Corporate Lab. His research in-
terest in computational intelligence spans across memetic computing, complex
design optimization, and big data analytics. He is the founding Editor-in-Chief
of the IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computational Intelligence,
Associate Editor of the IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation,
the IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks & Learning Systems, the IEEE
Transactions on Cybernetics, and others.
Pengfei Wei received his Ph.D. Degree from
School of Computer Science and Engineering,
Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singa-
pore, in 2018. During his Ph.D. study, he focused
on domain adaptation and gaussian processes. His
research has been published in leading conferences
and journals in related domains (e.g., ICML, IJCAI,
ICDM, IEEE TNNLS, IEEE TKDE). Currently, he is
a research fellow at School of Computing, National
University of Singapore.
Abhishek Gupta received his PhD in Engineer-
ing Science from the University of Auckland, New
Zealand, in the year 2014. He graduated with a
Bachelor of Technology degree in the year 2010,
from the National Institute of Technology Rourkela,
India. He currently serves as a Scientist in the
Singapore Institute of Manufacturing Technology
(SIMTech), Agency of Science, Technology and
Research (A*STAR), Singapore. He has diverse
research experience in the field of computational
science, ranging from numerical methods in engi-
neering physics, to topics in computational intelligence. His recent research
interests are in the development of memetic computation for automated
knowledge extraction and transfer across problems in evolutionary design.
